Very well formulated! I completely agree with the first point. I’m not so sure however that Detente with the West was ever really possible. Even China’s Opening Up was only possible because it was seen as the lesser threat to global imperialism, and its split with the USSR could be used to undermine the bigger threat. The last point is of course broadly correct, especially about how Brezhnev failed to course correct, but i think we would need to analyze more in depth what could have been done to provide that “pressure valve”. The Sino-Soviet split was devastating but it was also itself a symptom of the deeper problems with the course of the USSR post Stalin (though this by no means implies that China did not make its own very serious errors, especially in foreign policy).
Very well formulated! I completely agree with the first point. I’m not so sure however that Detente with the West was ever really possible. Even China’s Opening Up was only possible because it was seen as the lesser threat to global imperialism, and its split with the USSR could be used to undermine the bigger threat. The last point is of course broadly correct, especially about how Brezhnev failed to course correct, but i think we would need to analyze more in depth what could have been done to provide that “pressure valve”. The Sino-Soviet split was devastating but it was also itself a symptom of the deeper problems with the course of the USSR post Stalin (though this by no means implies that China did not make its own very serious errors, especially in foreign policy).