The government of Nayib Bukele has deployed more than 2,000 Salvadoran troops to Haiti, along with helicopters, drones, and armored vehicles. The deployment expands the foreign military presence in a country with a long history of occupations and interventions. Bukele justified the operation as a mission to recover four military technicians who went missing after an ambush on October 18. But the size of the contingent, El Salvador’s previously authorized role in the multinational force, and — above all — the expansion of the operation beyond that framework show that the deployment goes far beyond a search-and-rescue mission.
In Haiti, various mechanisms of intervention, control, and security converge. On the one hand, there is the Gang Suppression Force (GSF),1The GSF is a multinational contingent integrated with the Haitian police and army, composed primarily of troops and police officers from Chad and Kenya, supplemented by forces from El Salvador, Sri Lanka, Jamaica, Guatemala, and the Bahamas, under a unified international command in Port-au-Prince. authorized by the UN Security Council; on the other, the Haitian security forces and a specialized task force created by the Haitian government, which operates with support from Vectus Global,2 In August 2025, it was announced that Vectus Global had entered into a ten-year agreement with the Haitian government to combat armed groups and participate in the tax collection system for goods imported from the Dominican Republic. Although the scope of the agreement remains unclear, it indicates that the intervention may extend beyond military operations to strategic economic functions of the Haitian state. the private military company owned by Blackwater founder Erik Prince.3 Erik Prince is an American businessman and former military officer, a political ally of Donald Trump, and the founder of Blackwater, one of the world’s largest private military companies. In 2010, following scandals involving abuses and killings of civilians committed by his contractors in Iraq, he changed the name of his company to Xe Services and later to Academi. Prince subsequently founded other private security firms and created Vectus Global, which operates in Haiti. This is not a single structure or a unified chain of command, but rather distinct components of a policy that combines state forces, foreign contingents, and private contractors.
U.S. imperialism has provided political backing for the Salvadoran deployment and much of the intelligence and logistical support. Colombia provided logistical support for the transport of troops, and the Dominican Republic offered facilities for operations from its territory. On November 3, the United Nations clarified that the vast majority of the additional Salvadoran military personnel are not deployed under the GSF’s mandate; therefore, they fall outside the authority and reporting mechanisms of its support office in Haiti. Although El Salvador was already participating in the multinational force, the new contingent stems from a decision by the Bukele administration and operates under the chain of command of the Salvadoran Armed Forces, led by Minister of National Defense René Francis Merino Monroy.4René Francis Merino Monroy has been El Salvador’s defense minister since 2019 and is one of Bukele’s key military operatives. In 2020, he led the armed military occupation of the Legislative Assembly to pressure Salvadoran lawmakers into approving a $109 million loan requested by the government. Following an inquiry, the Assembly concluded that he had lied and evaded questions, recommended his dismissal, and referred the case to the Attorney General’s Office for possible criminal offenses. Bukele ignored the recommendation and kept him in office. He has dismissed allegations of arbitrary detentions, torture, enforced disappearances, and deaths in custody under the state of emergency. It is not subordinate to the GSF’s command or to United Nations leadership. The political and military decision-making for this operation rests with the Salvadoran executive branch: Bukele and his defense minister are responsible for its direction, conduct, and consequences.
Multinational Intervention Through 2027 and the Privatization of War
The composition of the GSF itself highlights the difficulties of sustaining this intervention. The Security Council authorized a ceiling of 5,500 uniformed personnel and 50 civilians, but as of August 31, only 1,213 uniformed personnel from six countries had been deployed. The force itself identified the pace of troop deployment as one of its main obstacles. Despite this, the Security Council extended its mandate through March 31, 2027. The gap between authorized and deployed personnel shows how hard it is for participating governments to provide the necessary forces and sustain an operation of this magnitude.
The intervention seeks to impose a military solution to the Haitian crisis in the name of restoring order and security, while the economic plundering, financial subjugation, and exploitation of the country’s resources by foreign interests continue. Occupation and militarization do not reverse this structure of colonial and imperialist dispossession; rather, they reproduce it and deepen the violence, abuses, and human rights violations suffered by the population.
Operations by Haitian security forces and a specialized task force, supported by Vectus Global and using armed drones, left at least 1,243 people dead and 738 wounded in 141 attacks between March 1, 2025, and January 21, 2026, according to Human Rights Watch. Among the dead were at least 43 adults and 17 children who, according to the organization, were not members of criminal groups. The investigation noted that some of these attacks may constitute extrajudicial killings and that they took place in densely populated urban areas. These figures pertain to drone attacks, not to security operations in Haiti as a whole.
This is the human cost of a policy that relies on lethal force as its response to the crisis. The involvement of private military companies represents an extreme manifestation of the privatization of war and foreign intervention. Vectus Global, led by Erik Prince, has provided support to the Haitian task force through drones, helicopters, and intelligence assistance. Human Rights Watch also documented that Prince hired Salvadoran operators to assist the Haitian police in the use of armed drones. Prince’s track record reflects a history of impunity and abuse by private military companies during the U.S. occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. Blackwater, his former company, was implicated in the 2007 Nisour Square massacre in Baghdad, when its employees killed 17 Iraqi civilians.
The current intervention also cannot be separated from the history of foreign occupations and missions in Haiti. The United States occupied the country from 1915 to 1934. Decades later, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), deployed between 2004 and 2017, faced numerous allegations of sexual abuse committed by members of its contingents and was linked to the introduction of cholera in 2010 — an epidemic that caused thousands of deaths. In 2016, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon acknowledged the organization’s moral responsibility and apologized. The GSF has a different mandate and structure than MINUSTAH, but that difference does not erase the historical experience of the Haitian people nor does it turn international authorization into a guarantee of respect for their rights.
The Salvadoran Deployment Did Not Begin with the Kidnapping
The kidnapping of the four Salvadoran soldiers provided Bukele with a pretext to publicly justify a larger-scale operation in Haiti, but Salvadoran military involvement in the country did not begin with that incident. On September 29, 2026, El Salvador’s Legislative Assembly — dominated by Nuevas Ideas and its allies — approved Decree 6795The initiative was introduced on September 29 and approved in 17 minutes, with 57 votes in favor and two against, without any debate or review of the bill’s content or the implications of increased Salvadoran military involvement in Haiti. with 57 votes, authorizing the Salvadoran Armed Forces’ participation in the GSF for twelve months and providing for the deployment of personnel, aircraft, and equipment to support its operations. That authorization preceded the disappearance on October 18. However, it must be distinguished from the later expansion: most of the new contingent sent by Bukele operates outside the framework of the GSF, and the agreement governing its actions has not been publicly explained with sufficient clarity.
On November 2, Salvadoran troops launched their first major ground operation on the Cul-de-Sac plain, northeast of Port-au-Prince, against the armed groups 400 Mawozo and Chen Mechan. Troops advanced in about ten armored vehicles with the stated goal of dismantling these groups, which were identified as responsible for the kidnapping of the four military technicians. The offensive shows that the deployment had moved beyond a search-and-rescue operation and become a direct military intervention against Haitian armed groups.
On October 31, Bukele rejected a Haitian organization’s allegations of bombings and airstrikes against the civilian population. He said that the Salvadoran attack helicopters had arrived on October 29 and had not carried out any missions until then. His denial is not independent verification of what occurred, nor does it address concerns about the risks that military operations pose to the civilian population. These allegations require investigation and guarantees of transparency, especially since most of the additional Salvadoran contingent operates outside the UN’s reporting mechanisms.
In line with the rhetoric of the imperialist powers, the Salvadoran government presents violence as a security problem separate from the social and political relations that underlie it. Thus, repression and military control are portrayed as inevitable responses to poverty, unemployment, looting, and the deterioration of living conditions. The “exported punitivism” championed by Bukele offers no way out of these conditions: militarization, mass incarceration, and repression block any independent political alternative led by workers and the popular sectors.
The “war on gangs” argument is not new in Haiti, either. It has served to legitimize successive foreign interventions, many of them carried out under a UN mandate or with UN backing. Although the Salvadoran government now presents its deployment as an operation to locate missing soldiers, its scope and political objectives go far beyond that search.
Bukele seeks to project internationally the militarization model he used to consolidate his power, based on mass incarceration and a state of emergency, presenting it as an exportable security formula and positioning himself as a leader in the fight against gangs. The intervention in Haiti offers him a new stage to showcase this model and demonstrate his willingness to take it beyond El Salvador’s borders, while strengthening his alliance with Donald Trump and aligning himself with Washington’s strategy to expand military coordination among allied governments on the continent, making troops and operational capacity available to that policy.
Reducing the reality in Haiti to the gang phenomenon in El Salvador is not an innocent oversimplification: it allows the military intervention to be presented as a security solution and obscures its political implications. On October 30, Bukele stated: “If we wipe out the gangs here [in El Salvador], we can wipe them out [in Haiti]. It’s up to them (the Haitians) whether they want us to wipe them out or not.” With this statement, he presents the Haitian population with a false dilemma: to accept that Salvadoran forces “wipe out” the armed groups or to side with those who supposedly stand in the way of pacification. This narrative also obscures the fact that armed groups do not operate outside of power structures: sectors of the Haitian political and economic elites have maintained ties with them, while a significant portion of the arsenal they use is of U.S. origin. As in all colonial discourse, there is no room for the people themselves to define what they need or what political solution they wish to build. This logic erases the historical, social, and political differences between El Salvador and Haiti, and strips Haitians of their capacity for political action and organization. This makes Bukele’s El Salvador a battering ram for advancing the Trumpist strategy in Central America and the Caribbean.
The more than 2,000 Salvadoran troops are thus joining a landscape of violence that weighs heavily on the population — a violence that cannot be understood apart from the relationships between armed groups, political and economic elites, and imperialist power. Although Bukele’s intervention aims to expand military capacity to pursue and strike specific organizations, it does not confront the power networks that have historically fostered them, nor the social and political conditions in which their violence is perpetuated. On the contrary, it reinforces a policy of occupation, repression, and military control that also subjugates the civilian population. The disappearance of the four military technicians serves as a pretext for the Salvadoran government to publicly justify a larger-scale operation and project its repressive policy beyond its borders, aligning itself with Washington’s interventionist strategy.
The Haitian Crisis Cannot Be Resolved with the Bukele Model
Bukele’s repressive playbook offers no solution to the Haitian crisis. The people of Haiti carry a history of resistance, but also a deeply fragmented social structure battered by decades of imperialist plunder. The violence currently ravaging the country is not merely criminal: armed groups have grown out of ties to political and economic networks, territorial disputes, and legal and illegal revenue streams. Sectors of the economic and political elites have maintained ties with these organizations and turned to them to vie for power, protect their businesses, and exercise control over territories and working-class neighborhoods. This does not make the gangs a homogeneous bloc, nor does it eliminate their own interests, but it shows that they cannot be understood in isolation from the power relations that permeate the state and Haiti’s ruling classes.
This history is also permeated by racism. Haiti has not been treated as just another country within the international order; its Black population and the anti-slavery nature of its revolution shaped the major powers’ relationship with the first independent Black republic from the very beginning. The 1804 revolution not only defeated French colonialism and abolished slavery; it challenged the racial order upon which the colonial and slave-based system rested. For this reason, Haitian independence was met with isolation, threats of reconquest, and economic sanctions. In 1825, France imposed reparations on Haiti to compensate former slave owners for the loss of their “property,” and the United States delayed recognition of Haiti’s independence until 1862. Later, the U.S. occupation from 1915 to 1934 perpetuated this relationship of domination through a racist narrative that portrayed Haitians as incapable of governing themselves. The image of Haiti as a backward, violent country incapable of establishing its own political order is not a neutral description of its reality: it is part of a colonial tradition that has served to justify its subjugation and foreign interventions.
The Haitian government is part of this entire web of militarization and subjugation of the Haitian people. Since February 7, 2026, when the term of the Transitional Presidential Council ended, Alix Didier Fils-Aimé has headed the executive branch. He leads a de facto government, lacking an electoral mandate of its own, which has enjoyed Washington’s direct support. His government openly endorses this intervention: it agreed with Bukele to strengthen security cooperation and supports the Salvadoran deployment. Furthermore, during his tenure, a specialized task force was created that operates with support from Vectus Global and has carried out drone strikes denounced by Human Rights Watch. This is a regime rooted in Haiti’s institutional decay, sustained by imperialism, and linked to the interests of the local ruling classes. Its collaboration with foreign forces undermines the country’s sovereignty and facilitates military intervention.
The Haitian government has no electoral legitimacy of any kind. Haiti has not held national elections since 2016, and the electoral calendar has been postponed once again; the first round of presidential and legislative elections has been rescheduled for July 18, 2027. The prolongation of provisional governments without elections cannot be separated from the political and social crisis the country is undergoing. Washington not only backs the authorities that facilitate intervention; it also intervenes in shaping the authorities that manage the Haitian crisis, while the local ruling classes preserve their own interests and responsibilities.
The dynamics of violence are not limited to a military confrontation between state forces and armed groups. The Associated Press reported that Wilson Joseph, known as Lanmò Sanjou and leader of 400 Mawozo,6The rise and expansion of 400 Mawozo and Wilson Joseph are part of a web of connections between armed groups and sectors of Haiti’s ruling classes, who use these gangs to vie for power, protect businesses, and control territories. As with other armed groups in the country, their ability to grow cannot be explained without considering the networks of patronage, protection, and complicity that link them to sectors of the elite. asked UN Secretary-General António Guterres to send a delegation to mediate a dialogue with international forces, while warning of the risk of reprisals against the population. Joseph claimed that the four Salvadoran technicians had been killed, but provided no evidence. The UN confirmed that it had received the letter and clarified that this does not imply recognition of the sender or endorsement of his claims. An armed leader’s initiative to negotiate does not make 400 Mawozo a representative of the Haitian people, nor does it erase the violence it perpetrates against them. It does, however, show that the conflict has its own dynamics, calculations, and interests that cannot be reduced to a mere security operation.
The Salvadoran Army is one of the pillars of the coercive apparatus through which Bukele sustains his political project: it participates in the state of emergency, the militarization of social life, and the control and disciplining of the population. Its deployment in Haiti projects that force beyond Salvadoran borders. The government seeks to present the deployment of troops — under the banner of nationalism stoked by the kidnapping of the four military technicians — as a national cause, while concealing its role in projecting its own agenda militarily abroad and in a Washington-driven offensive to reinforce its political and military dominance over Latin America and the Caribbean. In this way, Washington enlists allied governments in tasks that the major powers do not wish to undertake exclusively with their own forces.
A Military Solution That Deepens Dependence
The U.S.-led intervention seeks to impose a military solution and involve allied governments in that task, while Washington avoids directly bearing all of its political, economic, and human costs. The shortfall in GSF contingents, the deployment of new foreign forces, and the involvement of private military companies show how the U.S. seeks to spread among its allies and contractors the costs of an intervention that fails to produce a political solution Haitians consider legitimate. But this strategy does not rest solely on Washington’s decision and the participation of its allies: it also relies on the collaboration of the Haitian authorities. The Fils-Aimé administration agreed with Bukele to strengthen security cooperation and supports the Salvadoran deployment. The intervention is thus backed by a political power without an electoral mandate — sustained by imperialism and tied to the interests of the local ruling classes — which paves the way for new foreign military forces while undermining Haitian sovereignty.
Under the guise of combating gangs and defending regional security, military cooperation between Washington and its allied governments is expanding, and conditions are being created to support new interventions. In the Caribbean, this policy takes on a particularly dangerous dimension with regard to Cuba. The Trump administration has tightened the economic and energy blockade, deepened the island’s political isolation, and publicly maintained the threat of possible military action, although U.S. officials have indicated that there is no plan for imminent intervention. The point is not to claim that the deployment in Haiti has an operational mission against Cuba, but rather to situate it within a regional context of pressure, militarization, and the subjugation of the Caribbean peoples. Bukele seeks to play a role in this framework and is using Haiti as a stage to demonstrate his willingness to collaborate with U.S. strategy.
The intervention not only deepens Haiti’s subordination to the major powers; it also helps strengthen the political and military instruments with which Washington seeks to discipline the peoples of the Caribbean and contain any process that challenges its political dominance in the region.
Haiti does not need foreign guardianship or new military forces that seek to resolve by force a crisis whose roots lie in imperialist domination, inequality, and the breakdown of the state. International interventions, presented time and again as necessary responses to restore order, have not resolved this crisis; rather, they have deepened the misery, violence, and subordination of the Haitian people. A solution cannot come from the powers that uphold this order, nor from new occupation missions legitimized under the guise of peace and security. It requires that Haitian workers and the popular sectors be able to organize and build an independent political alternative — opposed to imperialism and the local ruling classes — with the capacity to decide their own future.
Only the working class and the oppressed people of Haiti can find a way out of the crisis created by the ruling classes and their governments, which are propped up by imperialism. They must take their destiny into their own hands and reject any form of military intervention, as well as any occupying force disguised as “peacekeeping” or “security” missions. In the course of their struggle, the Haitian people must strengthen their own mass organizations and establish bodies for self-determination, relying on their own strength and building internationalist solidarity among workers and peoples.
Originally published in Spanish on November 3 in La Izquierda Diario.
Notes[+]
Notes
| ↑1 | The GSF is a multinational contingent integrated with the Haitian police and army, composed primarily of troops and police officers from Chad and Kenya, supplemented by forces from El Salvador, Sri Lanka, Jamaica, Guatemala, and the Bahamas, under a unified international command in Port-au-Prince. |
| ↑2 | In August 2025, it was announced that Vectus Global had entered into a ten-year agreement with the Haitian government to combat armed groups and participate in the tax collection system for goods imported from the Dominican Republic. Although the scope of the agreement remains unclear, it indicates that the intervention may extend beyond military operations to strategic economic functions of the Haitian state. |
| ↑3 | Erik Prince is an American businessman and former military officer, a political ally of Donald Trump, and the founder of Blackwater, one of the world’s largest private military companies. In 2010, following scandals involving abuses and killings of civilians committed by his contractors in Iraq, he changed the name of his company to Xe Services and later to Academi. Prince subsequently founded other private security firms and created Vectus Global, which operates in Haiti. |
| ↑4 | René Francis Merino Monroy has been El Salvador’s defense minister since 2019 and is one of Bukele’s key military operatives. In 2020, he led the armed military occupation of the Legislative Assembly to pressure Salvadoran lawmakers into approving a $109 million loan requested by the government. Following an inquiry, the Assembly concluded that he had lied and evaded questions, recommended his dismissal, and referred the case to the Attorney General’s Office for possible criminal offenses. Bukele ignored the recommendation and kept him in office. He has dismissed allegations of arbitrary detentions, torture, enforced disappearances, and deaths in custody under the state of emergency. |
| ↑5 | The initiative was introduced on September 29 and approved in 17 minutes, with 57 votes in favor and two against, without any debate or review of the bill’s content or the implications of increased Salvadoran military involvement in Haiti. |
| ↑6 | The rise and expansion of 400 Mawozo and Wilson Joseph are part of a web of connections between armed groups and sectors of Haiti’s ruling classes, who use these gangs to vie for power, protect businesses, and control territories. As with other armed groups in the country, their ability to grow cannot be explained without considering the networks of patronage, protection, and complicity that link them to sectors of the elite. |
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