Its hard to say exactly, since I think the collapse of the USSR is probably one of the best examples where Marxist Longue durée analysis should be used.
However, if I can try at least
1.Preventing Krushev’s secret speech/takeover in general
This is probably the lynchpyn of the whole thing. You had many young comrades coming into the party [most notably Yeltsin and Gorbachev] and Krushchev’s first act would essentially shatter faith in the system high and low, much as how the Thermidorian reaction shattered the revolutionary spirit of france and gave way to Bonapartist cynicism.
Not only that, but the so called “anti-party group” generally had the better economic policies, and more experience.
Obviously this is as much the west’s ball game as it was the USSR’s. But putting so many resources into the military was one of the leading reasons of the decline. The Cuban missile crisis, ironically enough, was probably a missed opportunity for more comprehensive agreements on the matter.
3.The party remaining connected to the people
This one is a bit obvious, which is why its here instead of at the top. But the problem that occured with Perestroika is that the USSR was like a pressure cooker. There needed to be some way to release the steam and there never was. Breshnev was probably a really good example here of what not to do. His period in office didnt solve problems, leading to this pressure build up.
This also goes for eastern Europe in general tbh. Although I do agree with soviet intervention in the most high profile incidents, so im not sure about that tbh.
Overall what probably killed it most was the sino-soviet split, which, while Krushev was important, was brewing from the days of the internationale. [The third int is its own topic I’ll probably talk about one day though]
Very well formulated! I completely agree with the first point. I’m not so sure however that Detente with the West was ever really possible. Even China’s Opening Up was only possible because it was seen as the lesser threat to global imperialism, and its split with the USSR could be used to undermine the bigger threat. The last point is of course broadly correct, especially about how Brezhnev failed to course correct, but i think we would need to analyze more in depth what could have been done to provide that “pressure valve”. The Sino-Soviet split was devastating but it was also itself a symptom of the deeper problems with the course of the USSR post Stalin (though this by no means implies that China did not make its own very serious errors, especially in foreign policy).
Its hard to say exactly, since I think the collapse of the USSR is probably one of the best examples where Marxist Longue durée analysis should be used.
However, if I can try at least
1.Preventing Krushev’s secret speech/takeover in general
This is probably the lynchpyn of the whole thing. You had many young comrades coming into the party [most notably Yeltsin and Gorbachev] and Krushchev’s first act would essentially shatter faith in the system high and low, much as how the Thermidorian reaction shattered the revolutionary spirit of france and gave way to Bonapartist cynicism.
Not only that, but the so called “anti-party group” generally had the better economic policies, and more experience.
2.An earlier Detente if possible
Obviously this is as much the west’s ball game as it was the USSR’s. But putting so many resources into the military was one of the leading reasons of the decline. The Cuban missile crisis, ironically enough, was probably a missed opportunity for more comprehensive agreements on the matter.
3.The party remaining connected to the people
This one is a bit obvious, which is why its here instead of at the top. But the problem that occured with Perestroika is that the USSR was like a pressure cooker. There needed to be some way to release the steam and there never was. Breshnev was probably a really good example here of what not to do. His period in office didnt solve problems, leading to this pressure build up.
This also goes for eastern Europe in general tbh. Although I do agree with soviet intervention in the most high profile incidents, so im not sure about that tbh.
Overall what probably killed it most was the sino-soviet split, which, while Krushev was important, was brewing from the days of the internationale. [The third int is its own topic I’ll probably talk about one day though]
Very well formulated! I completely agree with the first point. I’m not so sure however that Detente with the West was ever really possible. Even China’s Opening Up was only possible because it was seen as the lesser threat to global imperialism, and its split with the USSR could be used to undermine the bigger threat. The last point is of course broadly correct, especially about how Brezhnev failed to course correct, but i think we would need to analyze more in depth what could have been done to provide that “pressure valve”. The Sino-Soviet split was devastating but it was also itself a symptom of the deeper problems with the course of the USSR post Stalin (though this by no means implies that China did not make its own very serious errors, especially in foreign policy).